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COMMENTARY:

BEYOND
DEBATE
MEANS BEYOND PROTECTION: COMMENTARY ON
CONSENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
By Lucas Allison
A racist hunch and a badge
Officer Nick McClendon pulled over Clarence Jamison for allegedly
driving with an unsecured temporary tag on July 29, 2013.1 This
pretext quickly evaporated, however, and the real reason McClendon
pulled Jamison over became apparent: McClendon stopped Jamison
because he was a Black man driving a convertible Mercedes Benz.
McClendon had a hunch and a badge, and he was not going to let
Jamison’s nettlesome constitutional rights get in his way. McClendon
was going to search Jamison’s vehicle with or without his consent.
After McClendon took Jamison’s ID, registration and proof
of insurance, he ran a background check on Jamison which
immediately came back clear.2 That did not satisfy McClendon, so
he called the National Crime Information Center and asked the
dispatcher to run a background check.3 While McClendon waited to

hear back from the NCIC, he walked back to Jamison’s Mercedes and
returned his paperwork.4
Jamison prepared to leave because he believed that the routine
traffic stop had come to an end, but McClendon was not done with
Jamison.5 McClendon had a hunch about the “vehicle.”6 McClendon
reached into Jamison’s Mercedes through the passenger window
and told him to “[h]old on a minute.”7 McClendon then asked
Jamison for consent to search his vehicle.8 When Jamison asked
why, McClendon changed the subject.9 After discussing Jamison’s
work as a welder, McClendon asked Jamison to search his vehicle a
second time.10 When Jamison asked why, McClendon told Jamison
that someone reported him for transporting ten kilograms of
cocaine in his car.11 Jamison knew McClendon was lying, so he stood
his ground and did not consent to a search.12 McClendon asked
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Jamison to search his vehicle a third time.13 Jamison told McClendon
that there were no drugs in his car and that he did not consent to
a search.14 McClendon lost his patience: he bent down, reached into
Jamison’s car again, suggestively tapped on the door panel, and told
Jamison, “Come on man, let me search your car.”15 Again, Jamison
told McClendon no.16 McClendon was done asking and told Jamison,
“I need to search your car because I got the phone call about 10 kilos
of cocaine.”17 Jamison finally relented and allowed McClendon to
search his car.18
Jamison stood on the side of the road while McClendon searched
his vehicle from top to bottom, inside and out, three times. When
McClendon did not find anything suspicious, he called a K9 to the
scene.19 When the K9 did not alert to drugs, McClendon was finally
satisfied. All told, Jamison stood on the side of the road for 110
minutes,20 and McClendon caused almost $4,000 of damage to
Jamison’s vehicle.21 Jamison filed, among other claims, a § 1983 claim
alleging unlawful seizure.22 McClendon filed a motion for summary
judgment asserting a qualified immunity defense. Federal district
court judge Carlton Reeves presided.

Qualified immunity: an insidious catch-22
Judge Reeves’s opinion reads more like a scholarly article on qualified
immunity than a legal opinion and it is a welcomed breath of fresh air
in the otherwise stale and gloomy area of qualified immunity analysis.
Judge Reeves does more than merely recite the facts, the relevant
legal doctrine, and then apply doctrine to fact. Instead, Judge Reeves
starts his opinion by reminding readers that Jamison’s experience
with McClendon is not unique.

Before reciting the facts of the case, Judge Reeves forces readers to
confront the reality that Black Americans experience every day—
that jaywalking, playing with a toy gun, looking like a suspicious
person, selling loose cigarettes, passing a counterfeit $20 bill,
assisting a child with autism, walking home from work, eating
ice cream in one’s own apartment, sleeping in one’s bed or car
and driving over or under the speed limit can be life-threatening
activities for Black Americans when police get involved. Reading the
facts of the case with this in mind, Judge Reeves makes clear that
we should be thankful Jamison, and not his estate, was a party to
the lawsuit.
After placing Jamison’s experience with McClendon in social context,
Judge Reeves takes readers back to the Reconstruction Era to place
§ 1983 in historical context. Judge Reeves explains that Congress
recognized the aid and comfort that state and local law enforcement
provided the Ku Klux Klan,23 and that it was Congress’s purpose in
passing the Ku Klux Klan Act (codified as § 1983) to put the federal
government between the states and “We the People” as a guardian
of our constitutional rights.24 As Judge Reeves explains, however,
the evolution of qualified immunity turned § 1983 on its head by
imposing ever-increasing burdens on § 1983 plaintiffs. First, the
Court held that § 1983 plaintiffs must prove that the officer acted in
bad faith.25 Next, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 plaintiffs must
prove that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional
right.26 Later, the Supreme Court stated that qualified immunity
protects all officers but “the plainly incompetent or those knowingly
violating the law.”27 Finally, the Court added the language “beyond
debate” to the clearly established requirement, forcing plaintiffs
to prove that every reasonable officer would have known that his
actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.28 The resulting
formula is problematic, to say the least: No precedent = no clearly
established law = no liability29 = no justice for Black Americans.

Judge Reeves applies the formula to the facts

Judge Reeves granted McClendon qualified immunity because
there was no clearly established law placing it “beyond debate”
that McClendon reaching into Jamison’s vehicle while waiting for
the results of a second background check was an unconstitutional
seizure. Some scholars have argued that Judge Reeves incorrectly
applied qualified immunity, and missed the forest for the trees.
Professor Orin Kerr argues, for example, that McClendon
“[s]ticking his arm inside the car and patting down the inside of the
door was obviously a search. It was governed by the [bright line]
rule, long recognized in the Fifth Circuit as clearly-established law,
that the officer needed some justification for that search—probable
cause, or a warrant, a safety or special needs concern.”30
In the author’s view, however, Kerr misperceives both the facts and
Jamison’s claim. Kerr mistakenly focuses on McClendon reaching
into the car and patting on the door panel to ask Jamison for
consent to search (the fourth time). These facts were not the basis
of Jamison’s fourth amendment claim, however. Jamison argued
that McClendon reaching his arm into the vehicle to prevent him
from leaving was an illegal seizure. Because Jamison based his claim
continued on next page >
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on McClendon using his arm to seize him, the bright line rule for car
searches was inapposite. This is precisely why McClendon’s waiting
for the results of a second background check distinguished the case
from clearly established law.
The cruel irony of this case is that McClendon’s racist hunch likely
insulated him from liability. Do any of the readers really think that
McClendon would have run a second background check to review
Jamison’s criminal history if Jamison were white?

Facing hard truths

Judge Reeves makes clear that qualified immunity’s impact on
society cannot be overstated. Any factual difference between
instances of police abuse, no matter how trivial, is grounds for
suspending one’s constitutional rights—especially if you are Black—
to the whims of a police officer. Because of qualified immunity, Black
Americans must fight for their constitutional rights case-by-case,
detail by grueling detail. The author, Judges Reeves and millions of
Americans realize that this is incompatible with the values of a free
and just society. It is time for the Supreme Court to come to the
same realization and abolish qualified immunity. What is required,
however, is a Supreme Court willing to acknowledge that qualified
immunity is a judicial manifestation of America’s problem with
white supremacy. It is unclear whether the current Supreme Court is
prepared to take on such a task.
1.	Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F.Supp.3d 386, 392 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 2020).
McClendon stated that Jamison’s temporary tag was “folded over where
he couldn’t see it.” But Jamison’s temporary tag was secured with four
screws, one in each corner. When McClendon was shown a picture of
Jamison’s temporary tag during a deposition, the temporary tag was
not creased. McClendon admitted that there were no creases on the
temporary tag but argued that cardboard can fold without creasing or
that someone may have ironed out the crease.
2.	Id. at 393.
3.	Id.

4.	Id.
5.	Id.
6.	Compl., ¶ 31, Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F.Supp.3d 386 (S.D. Miss. Aug.
2020) (“The Defendant McClendon told Mr. Jamison that when he got a
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true.”) (emphasis added).
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15.	Id.
16.	Id.
17.	Id.
18.	Id. at 394.
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20.	Id. at 395 n. 32. (Judge Reeves points out that, “In that amount of time,
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21.	Id.
22.	Id. at 395.
23.	Id. at 397-399.
24.	Id. at 402.
25.	Id. at 403.
26.	Id. at 404.
27.	Id.
28.	Id.
29.	Id. at 408.
30.	Orin Kerr, Did Judge Reeves Reach the Correct Result in Jamison
v. McClendon? (Aug. 6, 2020). Available at https://reason.com/
volokh/2020/08/06/did-judge-reeves-reach-the-correct-result-injamison-v-mcclendon/.
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